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ARGUMENT

I.

iDRIVE'S POSITION THAT IT DOES NOT NEED TO PERFORM
CARRIER CONTRACT OPTIMIZATION WORK RESULTING IN
BENEFICIAL CONTRACT CHANGES FOR INTEGRACORE IS
CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED INTENT OF THE PARTIES, THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENT, AND UTAH LAW.

One of the core issues for this appeal is whether Appellee iDrive Logistics, LLC
("iDrive") performed its obligations under the Pricing Optimization and Audit Services
Agreement (the "Agreement") in order to earn a right to receive payment for pricing

optimization services under the Agreement. Because iDrive undisputedly did not including no optimization services after May of 2011 - iDrive does not like the answer to
~

this question. As such, iDrive attempts to focus this Court on IntegraCore, LLC's
("IntegraCore") alleged breach of an obligation to inform and involve iDrive in
discussions with UPS in October of 2011. iDrive' s attempt to shift the focus to
IntegraCore, and thereby sidestep scrutiny of its own failure to perform, is unavailing as a
matter of law.
Under long-established Utah law, iDrive must "prove the actual rendition of all of
the services called for by [its] contract" to receive the reciprocal bargained-for exchange
of payment under the Agreement. Porter v. Hunter, 60 Utah 22,207 P. 153, 155 (1922) 1;
accord Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45, 46 (Utah 1974) (stating a party seeking to
1

iDrive attempts to distinguish Porter on the grounds that it addresses only time-is-ofthe-essence principles. This is incorrect. Porter states: "'To entitle a broker to the
payment of his commissions, it is essential that he prove not only the actual rendition of
all the services called for by his contract of employment, but that he complete the
performance thereof within the time stipulated .... "' Porter, 207 P. at 255 (citation
omitted). That iDrive contests this is perplexing; it is hombook law that a plaintiff must
perform his own obligations to recover under a contract.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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enforce a contract "must take care to discharge his own duties under the contract ...
[e ]ven if inconvenience or difficulty is encountered"). "[P]erformance by the party
seeking recovery" is a prima facie element of all contract claims. Bair v. Axiom Design,

L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ,I14, 20 P.3d 388. iDrive's obligation to perform is further
circumscribed by the fiduciary duties it owed to IntegraCore as the VP of Logistics and
IntegraCore's agent. (Agreement, §§l(a), 2, 7(b).) Thus, while IntegraCore disputes it
breached the Agreement, iDrive, as plaintiff, must independently show it performed its
obligations.
The issue of iDrive's performance has two parts: (1) what was iDrive required to
do in order to earn compensation under the Agreement and (2) did iDrive perform these
obligations? IntegraCore has addressed these issues in detail in its opening brief, and
limits its response here to addressing iDrive's arguments.

A.

The Parties Agreed iDrive Would Only Receive A Percentage of
Carrier-Contract Savings If It Provided Specific Pricing Optimization
Services To Create Such Savings.

1.

iDrive's argument that it did not need to perform carriercontract optimization services to demand compensation is
inconsistent with the Agreement read as a whole and Utah law.

Sections I (a) and 2 of the Agreement specifically identify a number of tasks
iDrive agreed to perform as "pricing optimization services" and as "Vice President (VP)
of Logistics" for IntegraCore. (See Agreement, §§ l(a) and (2), Add. E.)2 Section 3(a) of
the Agreement expressly ties iDrive' s right to receive compensation for pricing
optimization services to its fulfillment of these obligations resulting in savings to
2

All Fact or Addendum cites are to IntegraCore's opening brief.
2
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IntegraCore: "For providing the services set forth by this agreement, iDrive ... shall
<i'

receive thirty-eight percent (3 8%) of savings that the CUSTOMER derives from
iDRIVE'S optimization service." (Agreement, §3(a)(l) (emphasis added).) This
language qualifies the Agreement as an "earn-in" contract, for which iDrive must earn its
commission by delivering savings through its optimization efforts.
Nevertheless, the trial court held the Agreement allows "iDrive to collect 38% of
savings from all contract improvements regardless of whether or not iDrive actually
performed the optimization services." (Add. D, at 9-10.) iDrive claims this ruling is
supported by the underlined portions of these three provisions of the Agreement:
1.

Section 1(a): "Savings attributed to iDRIVE'S contract negotiations with the

Carriers will be determined by comparing incentives currently being offered to
CUSTOMER under the contract(s) with the Carrier(s) in effect on the date of
this Agreement, less the new incentives achieved from the Carrier(s) after the
date hereof and will be calculated based on actual shipping data.
2.

Agreement Term: " .... Any new Carrier agreement signed by CUSTOMER

during a period of 3 years after the execution date of this agreement shall be
deemed to be based on iDRIVE'S optimization efforts, whether negotiated
directly with Carrier(s) by iDRIVE, CUSTOMER or any other party and will
be billable for 36 months from new carrier agreement date .... "
3.

Section 3(a)(l): " .... iDRIVE shall receive thirty-eight percent (38%) of

savings that the CUSTOMER [IntegraCore] derives from iDRIVE'S
optimization service. All improvements made to any of CUSTOMER'S
contract(s) with Carrier(s) between the signature date on this Agreement and
the end of the Agreement term are considered to be the result of iDRIVE' S
optimization service. For the purposes of calculating savings from iDRIVE'S
optimization efforts with the Carrier(s), iDRIVE and CUSTOMER agree that
CUSTOMER'S current rates, incentives and terms will be used as the
benchmark. CUSTOMER'S benchmark data will be used as the basis for
calculating savings attributable to iDRIVE'S Pricing Optimization service."
Ci)

iDrive misinterprets the language and intent of these provisions. These provisions
do not relieve iDrive of its obligations to provide the agreed-upon carrier-contract
3
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optimization services, but rather were intended to simplify the calculation of the savings
after iDrive provided those services. Without such provisions the parties might have to
assign a value to each incentive acquired by IntegraCore in a new carrier proposal
presented by iDrive and trace it to a specific point of negotiation by iDrive to the Carrier.
Starting with Section l(a) of the Agreement, the language upon which iDrive
relies actually refutes its argument by expressly requiring that the "savings" to be
calculated according to the formula stated therein must be "attributed to iDrive's contract
negotiations with Carriers." (Id., § l(a).) This is in addition to the specific pricing
optimization/negotiation services recited in Section l(a) that iDrive is required to
perform. (Id.) iDrive's interpretation of the Agreement renders meaningless the
extensive list of carrier-contract optimization services iDrive was to provide, and then
writes out the word "attributed" in relationship to the concept of "savings" that
IntegraCore was to receive in exchange for sharing 3 8% of those savings with iDrive.
Similarly, iDrive ignores that payment under Section 3(a)(l) is expressly premised
on iDrive "providing the services set forth in this Agreement." (Id., §3(a)(l).)
Furthermore, Section 3(a)(l) expressly only allows payment of 38% of "savings that
[IntegraCore] derives from iDrive's optimization services" and, as with Section l(a),
requires that the "savings" must be based on "iDrive's optimization efforts with the
Carriers," and be "attributable to iDRIVE'S Pricing Optimization service." (Id., emphasis
added.) By focusing only on the "improvements" term in this section, iDrive ignores
these other express provisions that defeat its position. iDrive also completely disregarded
IntegraCore's argument in its opening brief that the trial court erred by equating the term
4
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"improvements" with "savings. " 3 iDrive does not get paid for improvements, only for
4iJ

generating carrier-contract savings that IntegraCore actually receives as a result of
iDrive's work. (See id., §§ l(a), 3(a)(l).)
The clause that most fits iDrive's position is in the "Agreement Term." This
provision, however, is not linked to the compensation provision, which specifically limits
iDrive to a percentage of contract "savings" IntegraCore "derives" from iDrive's
optimization services. (Id., §3(a)(l); see also fn. 3.) But, even this provision presupposes
iDrive has made "optimization efforts." (See id., p.1.) Moreover, to ascertain the parties'
intent, this clause must be harmonized with the other terms discussed above that require

a,

iDrive to provide pricing optimization services that result in carrier-contract savings to
IntegraCore in order to earn a right to 38% thereof. See Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ,r21,
994 P .2d 193 ('" [A ]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective
meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part
unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect."'). The interpretation that iDrive gets paid
regardless of whether it performs the agreed-upon optimization services does not

3

iDrive also claims the "improvement" clause should be given special emphasis
because it was added to the 2011 Agreement after not being in an earlier 2010 agreement
(which is not at issue) between the parties. (See iDrive's Brief, p. 5, ,I9.) The 2010
agreement contradicts iDrive's argument, as it states: "All improvements made to any of
CUSTOMER'S contracts with Carrier(s) between the signature date on this Agreement
and the end of the Agreement term, whether negotiated with the Carrier(s) by iDRIVE,
by CUSTOMER. or any other party, are considered to be the result of IDRIVE's
optimization service." (2010 Agreement, §4, R.2048 (emphasis added).) Thus, not only
was the "improvement" clause in the prior agreement, it was expanded. The concept of
improvement was narrowed under the operative 2011 Agreement.
5
Ct)
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harmonize all provisions, but overwrites some in favor of others, impermissibly leaving
some "of no effect." Id.
Furthermore, as stated in IntegraCore's opening brief, it has been held in
analogous circumstances that:
This type of provision, however, has not been interpreted to entitle the
broker to a commission under all circumstances. Rather, there must be
some proof of consideration for the contract by performance of services by
the real estate agent. The broker must show substantial performance of the
duties imposed on him by the contract, even if he does not produce a buyer
to be eligible for a commission.... Where such a showing is absent the
listing agreement has the characteristics of a unilateral contract, which is
not binding for lack of sufficient consideration....
Kruger v. Soreide, 246 N.W.2d 764, 773 (N.D. 1976); accord Kahler, Inc. v. Weiss, 539

N.W.2d 86, 91 (S.D. 1995). 4
The Utah Supreme Court employed a similar rationale focusing on the concept of
"bargained-for exchange" in Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7. In Peirce, the widow "Agnes"
sought to recover property her husband "Ted" transferred to other defendant relatives
4

iDrive argues Kruger and Kahler are distinct because they rely on a best-efforts clause
being inferred into the contracts. This argument is unavailing. iDrive has the obligations
of a fiduciary, an arguably higher burden than best efforts. See Baron Fin. Corp. v.
Natanzon, 509 F. Supp. 2d 501, 514 (D. Md. 2007) (observing, "Professor Farnsworth
stresses that the 'best efforts' [contract] standard 'presumably falls short of the standard
required of a fiduciary, who is required to act primarily for the benefit of another in
matters connected with his undertaking.'" (quoting E. F amsworth, Farnsworth on_
Contracts § 7.17c (2d ed.2001)). Moreover, Kruger did not imply a "best efforts" clause
into the contract; it required "substantial performance." See 246 N.W.2d at 773. Kahler
equated "best efforts" with "diligent efforts," see 539 N.W.2d at 91, which is simply a
duty imposed on every contracting party in Utah. See Fischer, 525 P.2d at 46.
Additionally, this basis for distinction is a red herring because the undisputed facts show
iDrive failed to even substantially perform, let alone use "best efforts." Finally, neither
Chumney v. Stott, 381 P.2d 84 (Utah 1963) nor Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. v.
Domcoy Investors, 733 P.2d 128 (Utah 1987) is inconsistent with Kruger or Kahler or
relieves a plaintiff of his burden to perform the contract.
6
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(ii

prior to Ted's death, as violating a postnuptial agreement between Agnes and Ted. Id. at
Ci

,I,Il, 4-5. In the postnuptial agreement, Agnes agreed to give all of her future paychecks
to Ted in exchange for Ted's promise to give Agnes "his estate" upon his death. Id. at

,IS. Agnes argued "Ted's promise to leave his estate to her necessarily implie[d]" he
would not give it away "in a manner that avoided his obligations under the agreement."
Id. The defendants claimed "estate" simply meant whatever property was left in Ted's

possession when he died. Id. The trial court agreed with defendants' interpretation. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court first observed that courts
interpret contracts to "'find implied promises to prevent a party's promise from being
•

performable merely at the whim of the promisor."' Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
Moreover, not only will courts look to the "reasonable expectations of the parties" and
the "nature and purpose the contract," but

Gi)

"where there is doubt about the interpretation of a contract, a fair and
equitable result will be preferred over a harsh and unreasonable one.
And an interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be
adopted only where the contract so expressly and unequivocally so
provides that there is no other reasonable interpretation to be given
it."
Id. (citation omitted).

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court held the trial court erred in its
interpretation. "[T]he consideration for which Agnes bargained ... must have been Ted's
forbearance from giving away substantial portions of his property before his death." Id.

Absent any restriction upon his ability to transfer his property by
will, gift, or otherwise, Ted essentially would have given no
7
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consideration. Rather, his promise to leave his estate to Agnes would
be an empty, illusory promise, performable at his own whim and
caprice. Thus, under the trial court's interpretation of the agreement,
no consideration existed upon which to create an enforceable
contract.

Id. at ,I26. Thus, to avoid making Ted's promise illusory, the Court interpreted the
agreement to impose implied "limitations" on his ability to transfer property. Id. at ,r28.
So it is here. The consideration for which IntegraCore bargained - and for which
it paid iDrive a retainer for seven months (R.1955)-was iDrive's promise to provide
specified carrier-contract optimization services to save lntegraCore money on its Carrier
contracts that it would not otherwise receive. (Agreement, §§l(a), 2, 3(a)(l).) As in

Peirce and Kruger, if iDrive is entitled to demand payment without producing the savings
it claimed only it could create, then its promise to provide the optimization services is "an
empty, illusory promise, performable at [its] own whim and caprice," rendering the
pricing optimization provision unenforceable for lack of consideration. Peirce, 2007 UT
7 at ,r26; Kruger, 246 N.W.2d at 773. As set forth in IntegraCore's opening brief {p. 33),
this conclusion is even more compelling here where the trial court held the one-sided
exculpatory clause barred IntegraCore's claim for breach of contract. That result, as a
matter of law, cannot be what the parties intended.

2.

The testimonies of the parties support IntegraCore's
construction of the Agreement.

Given the reasonableness of IntegraCore's interpretation of the Agreement as
compared to iDrive's, it is not surprising that the principals of both IntegraCore and

8
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(i)

iDrive testified in support of IntegraCore's interpretation. (lntegraCore's Brief, Facts 1012.) iDrive obviously does not like this testimony and attacks it on two fronts.
First, iDrive argues IntegraCore quoted Steven Chase and Shaun Rothwell out of
context. (iDrive's Brief, p.22-23.) This is not true. IntegraCore invites the Court to
review the deposition transcripts to reject this argument. (R.1832, 2015, 2020, 4132.)
Second, iDrive argues the parties' testimonies should be disregarded as extrinsic
evidence offered to vary the terms of the Agreement. (iDrive's Brief, p. 21.) iDrive is
incorrect. The Supreme Court has made clear that'" [r]ational interpretation requires at
least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence,"' including extrinsic evidence
~

of the parties' intent, when "reasonably supported by the language of the contract."
Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ,r,r26-27, 190 P.3d 1269. Here, the parties' testimonies

are reasonably supported by the language of the Agreement and have been offered to aid
~

in its interpretation, not vary its terms. Take, for example, Chase's testimony:
That's why our customers signed us on. Our commitment is: We
will find savings for you. Even if we don't-if we don't, you don't
pay us anything. You'll only pay us when you save money.
(R.4132.) Chase's testimony that iDrive must "find savings" for its customers to trigger a
right to receive payment is entirely consistent with IntegraCore's interpretation of
Sections l(a), 2 and 3(a)(l), and entirely inconsistent with iDrive's assertion that it
receives compensation under the Agreement regardless of whether it performs the
optimization services or its express tasks as VP of Logistics for IntegraCore.

~

9
4j
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B.

iDrive Did Not Perform the Required Optimization Services to Earn its
Compensation as a Matter of Law.

1.

The undisputed facts do not establish iDrive fulfilled its
optimization obligations.

As detailed in IntegraCore's opening brief (p. 34-38), the trial court also erred by
finding, as a matter of law, that iDrive "performed or was in the process of performing, as
required by the terms of the 2011 Agreement" as of October 2011. iDrive's effort to
justify this ruling merely highlights its lack of supporting evidence, let alone undisputed
supporting evidence. iDrive mischaracterizes the carrier-contract optimization process to
try to mask how completely it repudiated and abandoned its optimization obligations.
The optimization process is described in Sections l(a) and 2 of the Agreement.
The intent was to have iDrive - the optimization expert - take over "the contract
negotiation/optimization process" for IntegraCore. (Agreement, § l{a).) iDrive first
promised to gather information about IntegraCore by spending time at IntegraCore
"learning its current logistics practices and operations," "collecting and analyzing
IntegraCore's current parcel shipping data, pricing and Carrier contracts" and
"establishing negotiation parameters" with IntegraCore. (Id., §§l(a), 2.)
After learning IntegraCore's operations and negotiating baseline, iDrive then
promised to undertake affirmative activities to save IntegraCore money on its Carrier
contracts by "issuing Request for Proposals (RFP) to Carriers," "collecting and analyzing
the Carriers' responses to the RFP," "work[ing] directly" with the Carriers to "negotiate
pricing, terms and conditions with the Carriers," and then "presenting analysis on the
Carrier proposals to IntegraCore." (Id.) It was then supposed to be IntegraCore's
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i)

privilege and right to decide which Carrier(s) contracts to select from the proposals
presented by iDrive. (Id., §l(a).) This is, of course, not what happened.
The record shows iDrive undertook some of its early obligations to learn
IntegraCore's needs and establish a negotiating baseline with one Carrier (UPS), but then
petered off sharply to nothing when it came time to actually work to get IntegraCore
better Carrier contracts. It is undisputed Chase never visited IntegraCore after February
of 2011, in breach of his obligations under Section 2 of the Agreement. (IntegraCore's
Brief, Fact 18.) Similarly, but more concerning, iDrive is unable to identify a single
optimization effort made on IntegraCore's behalf, among all of the various obligations in
{i

Sections 1 and 2 of the Agreement, after May of 2011 when it last contacted UPS. (Id.,
Facts 25-28.) As the trial court found, "it is undisputed that iDrive did not perform any
negotiation services related to the UPS Agreement executed in October 2011." (Add. D,
at 3.) iDrive has offered no evidence it made even perfunctory optimization efforts with
any other Carriers. (Id., Facts 44-50.) It is also undisputed iDrive issued no RFPs to any
Carriers, including UPS. 5 (Id., Facts 23, 46, 50.) Tellingly, with respect to FedEx, iDrive
relies on purported discussions from 2009, (iDrive's Brief, p. 9-10), even though Kurt
Spiers testified he would have been open to new negotiation with IntegraCore.

il

(lntegraCore's Brief, Fact 45). iDrive's refusal to try to generate contract proposals from

5

iDrive claims Trujillo admitted the May 3, 2011 email to UPS was an "RFP." This is
not true. Trujillo testified in response to a direct question that UPS considered an RFP to
be a formal document, with different characteristics than the May 3, 2011 email.
(R.1945-46.) By contrast, iDrive relies on an indirect question that happens to use the
terms "request" and "proposal" in the sentence in a different context. (R.2721.) This
does not undermine Trujillo's testimony that there was no RFP issued. (R.1945-46.)
11
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all Carriers is a critical failure because it cost IntegraCore the benefit of comparing
amongst competing bids from the Carriers to obtain greater - i.e., optimized - carriercontract savings.
Furthermore, the cover story iDrive created to try to justify its failure to perfonn
further highlights how completely it shirked its contractual and fiduciary obligations.
iDrive claims that in the summer of 2011, Haderlie orally requested to "take the lead in
negotiations with UPS," and iDrive agreed to "step back" to allow Haderlie to "run point
in those negotiations." (IntegraCore's Brief, Fact 30.) iDrive claims to have done this
even though Rothwell testified Haderlie was not qualified to negotiate with Carriers. (Id.,
Fact 31.) Although IntegraCore disputes the "delegation" to Haderlie ever happened
(id.), the effort to delegate is unequivocal evidence of iDrive's refusal to perfonn at least
its duties to directly work and negotiate with Carriers, and its duty to effectively
"manage" the contract negotiation/optimization process for IntegraCore. (Agreement,
§§ l(a), 2.) There is no evidence Haderlie was authorized to relieve Chase or iDrive of
any duties under this Agreement, particularly when Chase was expressly required to
report to Broman. (Id., §l(a).) This is not just a failure to perform, but a material breach
by iDrive.
Finally, as detailed in IntegraCore's opening brief (p. 37, 45-46), iDrive's reliance
on the audit service function to establish it performed its optimization obligations is
erroneous because the "auditing services" were clearly separate and divisible from the
"pricing optimization services" under the Agreement. The separately defined and
separately compensated audit services did not lead to savings under a new Carrier
12
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Qj

agreement for IntegraCore, and iDrive is not seeking compensation for audit services.
i>

Notably, iDrive did not respond to IntegraCore's authorities on "divisible contracts,"
which recognize that clearly distinct services under a single agreement are treated as
independent contracts. In re Payless, 203 F.3d 1081, 1085 (8 th Cir. 2000).
In sum, it is undisputed iDrive did not provide the services bargained-for and
required by Sections l(a) and 2 of the Agreement. It was thus IntegraCore, rather than
iDrive, that should have been granted summary judgment.
2.

The lack of an express "time is of the essence" clause does not
excuse iDrive's nonperformance.

iDrive argues that because there was no "time is of the essence" clause in
Agreement, it had an unlimited time to perform its optimization duties. This argument
fails for two primary reasons.
a.

iDrive's fiduciary obligations preclude neglect of duty.

As indicated in IntegraCore's opening brief (p. 26-27, 39), by agreeing to serve as
both VP of Logistics (an officer) oflntegraCore (Agreement, §§l(a) and 2), and as an
•

"agent" of IntegraCore (id., §7(b)), Chase and iDrive incurred fiduciary obligations to
IntegraCore. 6 As fiduci~ries, iDrive and Chase could not simply sit idle and hope
IntegraCore acquired a new Carrier contract in some other way during the term of the
Agreement. They were required to subordinate their interests to IntegraCore' s and use at
least their "best efforts" to accomplish their tasks. 7
6

See C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 (Utah Ct. App. 1995);
Eager v. Burrows, 2008 UT 42, if25, 191 P.3d 9.
7

These principles are discussed in detail in IntegraCore's opening brief, p. 26-27.
13
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iDrive does not dispute a fiduciary carries such obligations. Instead, iDrive argues
its duties are merely contractual, not fiduciary. iDrive claims this "precise issue" was
discussed in Orlando Lillena, LC v. United Title Services of Utah, Inc., 2015 UT 55, 355
P .3d 965. This case does not support iDrive. The Supreme Court did not consider the
issue iDrive raises. Id. at ,I40 n. 5. Contrary to iDrive's argument, it is well established
that corporate officers and agents owe fiduciary duties to their principals (see fn. 6). This
is not changed by the Orlando case, which recognized:
A "fiduciary relationship" exists between two parties when one of
them "is required to act for the benefit of [the other] on all matters
within the scope of their relationship" .... The same goes for a
principal's agent, who is required to act solely for the benefit of the
principal in matters connected with the agency.
Orlando, 2015 UT 55 at ,I34 (citations omitted). iDrive was required to "manage the

contract negotiation/optimization process with Carrier(s) ... on IntegraCore's behalf."
(Agreement, § l(a) (emphasis added).) iDrive thus had fiduciary obligations to
IntegraCore that precluded it from neglecting or abandoning its optimization/negotiation
efforts for IntegraCore's benefit, or trying to delegate this obligation back onto
IntegraCore's employees.

h.

Tlte Agreement requires iDrive to perform before it gets
paid.

iDrive also overlooks that the Agreement expressly required iDrive to perform
"the services set forth in this [A]greement," before lntegraCore was required to
compensate iDrive for those services. (Agreement, §3(a)(l)). It thus does not matter
whether there was a clause making "time of the essence" because IntegraCore's duty to

14
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pay iDrive for pricing optimization services did not arise until iDrive earned its pay by
@

performing its obligations under the Agreement, which it never did. See Fischer, 525
P.2d at 46-47; Kruger, 246 N.W.2d at 773; Kahler, 539 N.W.2d at 91.
iDrive argues, however, that IntegraCore was required to notify iDrive that its
performance was untimely. IntegraCore addressed this argument, and iDrive' s
authorities, in its opening brief (p. 41 ), to which iDrive did not respond. IntegraCore will
not address it further here except to add one additional point.
This rule is not applicable for the additional reason that IntegraCore did not seek
to rescind the Agreement. See Barrett v. Johnson, 150 N.Y.S.2d 853, 861 (1956)

~

(refusing to apply rule where "plaintiffs did not elect to rescind this contract.") As
observed by the Barrett court:
"' Where one party to a contract abandons it and refuses further
performance, or his conduct indicates that he repudiates the contract,
the other party is entitled to rescind. He is not, however, bound to
rescind, but he may keep the contract alive and sue upon it for a
breach, or he may adopt a middle course and treat the contract as at
an end for the purposes of further performance, but as still alive for
the purpose of adjusting the rights of the parties as to the
breach .... "'
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 17 C.J.S., Contracts,§ 429, p. 912)).

It must again be emphasized that iDrive never performed a single optimization
task after May of 2011, long before IntegraCore's first asserted breach in October of
2011. iDrive claims it did not learn of IntegraCore's October 2011 UPS contract until
November of 2012, (R.2657), yet the record shows it continued to ignore its optimization
i)

obligations through that date and thereafter. iDrive was not misled into continued
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performance and is not "out" anything because iDrive did not do any optimization tasks
after May of 2011. iDrive itself has claimed it incurred "no costs" performing this
Agreement (R.4555, if5), and, of course, iDrive was paid a retainer to provide
optimization services. (R.1955.) The rationale for applying the rule requiring notice is
thus absent, particularly where Chase/iDrive was IntegraCore's appointed agent and
fiduciary. See id. (observing, "'[t]he basis of the rule requiring notice of intention to
rescind is to be found in the reluctance of the courts to enforce penalties and forfeitures in
matters of contract,'" and refusing to apply rule where there was no penalty or forfeiture.)
For similar reasons, iDrive's estoppel argument is inapplicable.
II.

INTEGRACORE DID NOT MATERIALLY BREACH THE AGREEMENT.
One of iDrive's primary arguments is that IntegraCore materially breached the

Agreement in October 2011 by executing "a new UPS contract without iDrive's
knowledge, review and input." (iDrive's Brief, p. 27.) In its opening brief (p. 44),
IntegraCore argued the trial court erred by concluding, as a matter of law, that this
constituted a material breach by IntegraCore. iDrive called this argument "patently
absurd." (iDrive's Brief, p. 28.)
It is iDrive's position that lacks foundation. It strains credulity to believe iDrive

would have filed this lawsuit if, all other things being the same, IntegraCore had paid
iDrive 38% of the savings under October 2011 UPS contract. Where iDrive did nothing
to acquire or shape that contract through carrier-contract optimization efforts for
IntegraCore, this would have been a complete windfall. Cross v. Olsen, 2013 UT App
135, ,I27, 303 P.3d 269 (defining material breach as "'a failure of performance which
16
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defeats the very object of the contract or [is] of such prime importance that the contract
ti)

would not have been made if default in that particular had been contemplated .... '"
(citation omitted)).
Furthermore, iDrive's obligation to provide optimization services is for the sole
benefit of IntegraCore; it is not a right of iDrive that iDrive can take advantage of or sue
upon. Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Utah 1992). IntegraCore has

~

the exclusive right to decide whether to enter into any new Carrier contracts.
(Agreement, § l(a) - "Final selection of a Carrier(s) is the CUSTOMER's decision.")
This being the case, any failure to notify or involve iDrive is, itself, not material.
This is best illustrated by a hypothetical. Suppose iDrive had fulfilled its
optimization obligations and brought two proposals for Carrier contracts to
IntegraCore-one from UPS and one from FedEx. Suppose further the FedEx proposal
resulted in significantly greater savings compared to the existing FedEx contract than the
UPS proposal, which would result in a higher payment to iDrive under §3(a)(l) if the
FedEx proposal were selected. If IntegraCore for any reason chooses the UPS proposal
instead, however, iDrive has no cause for complaint or damages, because it is
IntegraCore's sole choice. (See Agreement, § I (a).) Therefore, any failure to notify or

Gt

involve iDrive is not material because iDrive has no say in the decision. IntegraCore is
free to disregard iDrive's advice or interests in selecting any Carrier proposal.
In fact, any failure to notify and involve iDrive before executing the October 2011

@

UPS contract, similar to the failure to pay iDrive a percentage of the savings, is not a
breach of the Agreement at all on this record. The undisputed evidence of
17
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nonperformance detailed above shows iDrive materially breached the Agreement well
before any purported breach by IntegraCore, including by Chase's failure to make the
required visits to IntegraCore and iDrive's and Chase's undisputed refusal to perform any
optimization obligations after May of 2011. 8
iDrive further ignores that it was not hired simply to get IntegraCore new Carrier
contracts, but rather to optimize all of those contracts through its expertise. (Agreement,
§l(a).) Nothing precluded iDrive from bringing this expertise to bear through Chase, as a
fiduciary. Chase was appointed as IntegraCore's VP of Logistics to remove any such
barriers. (IntegraCore's Brief, Fact 4.) Yet, iDrive's own expert confirms IntegraCore did
not receive an optimized contract from UPS in October 2011. (/d., Fact 41.) IntegraCore
has llQ new contracts from any other Carriers, let alone optimized contracts. Indeed,
given iDrive's complete abandonment of its optimization obligations -highlighted by its
allegation that it delegated these responsibilities back to IntegraCore - the only
reasonable inferences that can be drawn is that IntegraCore would not have received any
new contract from iDrive's efforts, and still does not have the optimized contract it hired
iDrive to find. This factual record establishes breach by iDrive, not IntegraCore.

III.

INTEGRACORE DID NOT WAIVE THE DEFENSE OF
NONPEFORMANCE.
IntegraCore addressed the errors in this ruling in its opening brief (p. 45-46).

iDrive did not respond to IntegraCore' s points, but merely regurgitated its argument from
8

See, e.g., High Valley Water Co. v. Silver Creek Investors, 2006 UT App 90, * 1, 2006
WL 563294 (March 9, 2006) (unpublished) ("A breach occurs when one party repudiates
or refuses to perform under a contract.").
18
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Ci

below. For the reasons stated in its opening brief, IntegraCore did not waive the defense
Gib

of nonperformance, and certainly not as a matter of law.
IV.

IDRIVE'S SHIFTING USPS CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

iDrive's Attempt to Distance Itself from its Oral Modification Theory
Fails Because its USPS Claim is Not Supported By the Agreement.

iDrive's USPS claim grows ever more muddled. On appeal, iDrive no longer
expressly claims the parties "modiflied]" or "alter[ed]" the terms of the Agreement with
®

respect to USPS. The reason for iDrive's attempt to retreat from its oral modification
theory is readily apparent: the theory is legally barred on five grounds set forth in
IntegraCore's opening brief (p. 48-51).
Of course, this does not solve the problems with iDrive's USPS claim. iDrive
asserts USPS is a "Carrier" under the Agreement, and therefore IntegraCore has an
"obligation" under the Agreement "to inform and involve iDrive in all decisions related
to changes to USPS pricing." (iDrive's Brief, p. 49.) iDrive further asserts it is "seeking
damages, under the same rationale set forth herein related to UPS." (Id., p. 50.)
The facts are that IntegraCore did use iDrive's USPS account for a period of time

~

and that IntegraCore paid iDrive in full for all such shipments. (IntegraCore's Brief,
Facts 52, 56.) There was nothing more to it than that. However, the arrangement to use
iDrive as a USPS broker was not governed by the Agreement, which is the only contract
at issue. 9

€i

9

For example, the compensation IntegraCore paid to iDrive as a USPS broker - a markup on every USPS shipment - is not even addressed in the Agreement.
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iDrive's attempt to save its USPS claim by trying to bootstrap it to the notice
provision of the Agreement fails. That provision refers to contracts between IntegraCore
and the Carrier itself, stating "CUSTOMER is obligated to notify iDRIVE of any changes
to Carrier(s) contracts or terms and conditions, sixty (60) days prior to implementation."
(Agreement, ifl(c) (emphasis added).) Other terms of the Agreement are similarly tied to
a putative new contract between IntegraCore and the Carrier. 10 Although USPS is
defined as a "Carrier" in the Agreement, (Agreement, p. 1), it is undisputed IntegraCore
did not enter into any new contracts with USPS after the Agreement was executed.
Rather, as iDrive acknowledges, IntegraCore began using iDrive's USPS account for
USPS shipments for a while and then switched to Move Method's USPS account. (R.910, 2238.) Neither iDrive nor Move Method is defined as a "Carrier" in the Agreement.
(Agreement, p. 1.)
This is not the only problem with iDrive's USPS position. There is also no
provision of the Agreement requiring IntegraCore to use iDrive' s USPS account; to use it
exclusively; or to continue to use it for any length of time. Even if a broker like iDrive or
Move Method were a "Carrier," which they are not under the Agreement, the Agreement
states that "[t]inal selection of the Carrier is the CUSTOMER's decision," which would
allow IntegraCore to switch brokers at any such time. (Agreement, ifl(a).) iDrive even
acknowledges "IntegraCore, and only IntegraCore, has the ultimate decision making
authority" as to which USPS broker to use. (iDrive's Brief, p. 52.)
10

(See id., Agreement Term - stating the term "will be three (3) years from the date
that the CUSTOMER executes an initial or new revision of an existing Agreement(s)
with the Carrier(s) .... " (emphasis added); see also id., §§ l(a), 3(a).)
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However, iDrive misapprehends the impact of this freedom of choice. Without a
ti)

provision requiring IntegraCore to use iDrive's account, iDrive cannot establish
IntegraCore breached the Agreement by using Move Method's USPS account or recover
"lost profit" damages for money iDrive claims it lost when IntegraCore switched to Move
Method. Where there is no obligation to continue to use iDrive's USPS account, it also
does not matter whether the USPS rates charged by iDrive or Move Method were better,
or whether iDrive had a chance to analyze which rates were better before the switch.
Certainly, there could be no cognizable contract damages to iDrive from the switch.
iDrive can thus establish neither the required elements of "breach" nor "causation" to

@

maintain its USPS claim. Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App
438,116, 83 P.3d 391 (holding that a lack of evidence of causation between injury and
breach was fatal as a matter of law).
Indeed, iDrive invented the oral-modification theory below to try to avoid these
very holes in its pleaded USPS claim. Despite shedding the oral-modification label for
appeal, iDrive still references some purported discussions between Chase and Broman in
its brief. Notably absent, however, is any reference to evidence of an agreement by
IntegraCore to compensate iDrive for switching to Move Method's account, even though

i>

this is a key alleged term upon which its claim is based. Moreover, regardless of whether
iDrive uses the label "modify" or not, it is a distinction without a difference. Any attempt
to change terms of the Agreement through a purported oral understanding fails as a

@

matter oflaw for the same reasons as its oral-modification theory.
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B.

iDrive Has No Cognizable Damages on its USPS Claim.

iDrive's Brief also confirms its USPS claim fails for the independent reason that

'lb

iDrive has failed to prove damages. The only damage measure iDrive has offered is
Richard Hoffman's calculation of the profit "margin iDrive should have made on the
IntegraCore's USPS shipments made using Move Method's USPS account." (R.2240.)
This lost-profit-margin measure of damages is not supported by the language of the
Agreement, which limits iDrive to 38% of "savings" IntegraCore derives from iDrive's
optimization services. (Agreement, §3(a)(l).)
iDrive concedes this measure of damages is not supported by the Agreement by
arguing, "Mr. Hoffman[] has done the best analysis he could to approximate 38% of the
delta of savings, given the limited data produced." (iDrive' s Brief, p. 51.) iDrive insists
Mr. Hoffman's "best analysis" is good enough because it is not required to prove the

"amount of the loss ... with precision." (Id.)
iDrive misconstrues its burden. This is a contract claim. "Breach of contract
damages seek to place the aggrieved party in the same economic position the party would
(ii

have been in if the contract was not breached." Eleopulos v. McFarland & Hullinger,
LLC, 2006 UT App 352,110, 145 P.3d 1157. Although the law does provide some room

for error in calculating damages, this does not mean iDrive can recover a measure of
damages that is not supported by the contract it is trying to enforce. Such damages would
not put iDrive "in the same economic position" as if the contract had not been breached.
Id. iDrive has thus not met its "'burden to produce a sufficient evidentiary basis to

establish the fact of damages and to permit the trier of fact to determine with reasonable
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certainty the amount' of those damages." Stevens-Henager Coll. v. Eagle Gate Coll.,
®>

2011 UT App 37, ,16, 248 P.3d 1025 (quotations and citations omitted).
V.

IntegraCore Did Not Waive Any Objection to the Ruling on iDrive's Claim
for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
iDrive argues IntegraCore waived any objection to the trial court's ruling that

IntegraCore breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not
addressing this ruling in its opening brief. iDrive's position fails for at least two reasons.
First, this matter is before this Court on a permissive appeal from interlocutory
orders, not an appeal as a matter of right from a final order. This is dispositive:
Because the rulings ... were not final, appealable orders, Father was
not required to appeal them under rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, see Utah R.App.P. 3(a), and the fact that he
could have elected to petition for interlocutory appeal, see id. R. 5,
does not eliminate our authority to review those decisions once the
neglect and termination proceedings were completed and an appeal
timely filed. Contrary to the GAL's contention, Father's failure to
petition for interlocutory appeal does not limit either his ability to
later appeal these issues or our jurisdiction to consider these issues.

State ex rel. S.F. v. State, 2012 UT App 10, ,28, 268 P.3d 831; accord State v. Troyer,
~

866 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1993).
iDrive cites no authority to the contrary. The one case iDrive cites, Brown v.

Glover, 2000 UT 89, 16 P.3d 540, is inapposite. Brown does not involve an appeal from
interlocutory orders. See id. at ,10. It does not even support the point for which iDrive
cites it. Even if this were an appeal as of right, Brown would allow IntegraCore to
respond to any issue raised in iDrive's appellee's brief, including the errors in the implied
covenant ruling. See id. at ,,24-25.
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Second, iDrive ignores that its claims for breach of express contract and breach of
the implied covenant are wholly duplicative. (Compare R.14, ,58, with R.15, ,62.) The
trial court relied on the same alleged conduct to support its rulings on both claims and
described the alleged breaches of the implied covenant as breaches of "express dut[ies ]"
under the Agreement. (Compare Add. D., at 8 with Add. D., at 2-3.) Thus, the errors in
the rulings on iDrive's express contract claim are equally applicable to iDrive's implied
covenant claim. .
There is also a more fundamental flaw in iDrive's implied covenant claim: Parties
cannot maintain duplicative claims for breach of express contract and breach of the
implied covenant. See Canopy Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 395 F.Supp. 2d 1103, 1111 (D.
Utah 2005) (dismissing plaintiffs' "claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing" as "redundant of its breach of contract claim," and noting "[t]o state a separate
claim, [plaintiffs] must demonstrate some implied promise separate from a breach of the
Agreement's term provision that could support this separate cause of action.").
IntegraCore sought summary judgment on iDrive's implied covenant claim on this exact
basis. (R.1972-73.) The trial court disregarded IntegraCore' s argument, which is an
independent error that should be remedied now because iDrive made the claim an issue in
its appellee's brief. Brown, 2000 UT 89 at ,24-25.
CONCLUSION

For each and all of the foregoing reasons, and those stated in IntegraCore's
opening brief, the trial court's rulings should be reversed.
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